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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF ESTATE TAXES UPON THE
RIGHT OF ELECTION
The impact of estate taxes upon the surviving spouse's right to elect against
a will was at issue in two cases affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.'
Since the basic issue in both cases was the same, a discussion of one will
serve to illustrate the problem. In Matter of Edwards2 the will contained a
bequest to the widow of the income for life from a trust of one-third of the
net estate after the deduction of debts, funeral and administrative expenses,
and any estate or other taxes. The widow's share in intestacy would have
been a one-third share subject to debts and funeral and administrative expenses,
but not subject to estate taxes either federal or state.3 The widow claimed
that, since by the provisions of the will and the applicable tax laws the
corpus of the trust would be reduced by estate taxes, whereas her share if
she took by intestacy would not, the will failed to comply with the requirements
of section eighteen of the Decedent Estate Law. She, therefore, claimed a
limited right of election to take the amount of the estate taxes which would be
4
assessed against the trust corpus.
Paradoxically, the term "intestate share" has no relation to cases where
decedent dies intestate. "Intestate share," as referred to in section eighteen of
the New York Decedent Estate Law, is a term of art, meaning that amount
which the widow would receive under an election against the will. Generally
speaking, it is equivalent to the share she would have received in intestacy
under section eighty-three of the Decedent Estate Law with the major exception that in no event can the intestate share exceed one half of the net
estate. Within this limitation, however, the will must provide an amount
equal to that which would have been received in intestacy. Thus "intestate
share" and "share in intestacy" are generally equivalent terms. 5 The widow
1. Matter of Edwards, 2 Misc. 2d 564, 152 N.Y.S.2d 7 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd without opinion,
2 A.D.2d 838, 156 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd without opinion, 3 N.Y.2d 739, 143
N.E.2d 520 (1957); Matter of Ruppert, 1 Misc. 2d 1072, 148 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Surr. Ct.
1955), aff'd without opinion, 2 A.D.2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd without
opinion, 3 N.Y.2d 731, 143 N.E.2d 517 (1957).
2. Supra note 1.
3. See note 10 infra.
4. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18(1) (b). Actually, the widow in Matter of Edwards had
the limited right to elect to take $2,500 outright from the trust corpus but this had no
bearing upon the right of election she was claiming in respect to the taxes. In Matter of
Ruppert, 1 Misc. 2d 1072, 148 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Surr. Ct. 1955), aff'd without opinion, 2
A.D.2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1st Dep't 1956), aff'd without opinion, 3 N.Y.2d 731, 143
N.E.2d 517 (1957), the section involved was N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18(1) (d) but, again,
this had no bearing upon the right of election claimed in respect to the taxes.
5. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18(1) (a). The section, as amended by L. 1955, c. 487, now
reads: "In exercising the right of election herein granted . . . the words 'intestate share'
. . . shall be construed to mean the surviving spouse's share of the estate as in intestacy
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in the Edwards case argued that she should actually receive in trust the same
amount that she would have taken outright had testator died intestate. Since
that was not the case, the will failed to provide her with a trust equal to, or
greater than, her intestate share and, therefore, she had a right to elect.
The surrogate, however, held that for the purposes of determining whether
a right of election exists under section eighteen, it is enough to compare the
amount provided in the will before taxes with the intestate share, .which is to
be computed before taxes, if any. In this case the will provided a one-third
share and the intestate share was also one-third. Thus there was no right
or one-half of such net estate, whichever is smaller. In computing such net estate all
estate taxes shall be disregarded, but nothing herein contained shall be construed as
relieving such surviving spouse from contributing to all such taxes the amounts apportioned against him or her pursuant to . . . section one hundred twenty-four . .. ."
The court in Matter of Ruppert, supra note 4, cited the amendment as "further evidence
of the legislative plan to harmonize sections 18 and 124 so that each is operative in its
own sphere and the tax allocation does not begin until the share of each beneficiary is
computed." 1 Misc. 2d at 1073, 148 N.Y.S.2d at 543. The difficulty with this proposition
is that, in cases where the taxation of the share under the will and the share in intestacy
is unequal, the result seems to conflict with earlier expressions of legislative intent in
regard to § 18. See pp. 241-42 infra. In any event, § 18(1) (a) seems to have no bearing
upon the problem for it merely states that the intestate share is to be computed before
taxes. Certainly it is not a legislative mandate that the share under the will is also to be
computed before taxes.
The amendment seems to have been designed to settle the apparent conflict between
Matter of Ryan, 280 App. Div. 410, 114 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1st Dep't 1952), in which it was
held that the intestate share was to be computed after the deduction of estate taxes
both state and federal, and Matter of Peters, 204 Misc. 333, 88 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Surr. Ct.),
aff'd mem., 275 App. Div. 950, 89 N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dep't 1949), which held that the
intestate share, as such, was to be computed before the deduction of any estate taxes.
Cf. Matter of Spencer, 145 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Surr. Ct. 1955); Matter of Vitale, 118 N.Y.S.2d
773 (Surr. Ct. 1952). The court of appeals in Matter of Wolf, 307 N.Y. 280, 287, 121
N.E.2d 224, 227 (1954), distinguished Matter of Ryan, supra, from Matter of Peters,
supra, stating, in effect, that they represented two distinct rules for computing the
intestate share based upon two distinct fact situations. Where taxes are not to be
apportioned, as in Matter of Ryan, supra, where § 124 was not applicable because testator
had shifted the entire tax burden to the residuary clause to the widow, the intestate share
is to be computed after the deduction of estate taxes. Where, however, taxes are to be
apportioned, as in Matter of Peters, supra, where testator failed to make any provision
thus bringing § 124 into operation, the intestate share is to be computed before the
deduction of taxes. The amendment, therefore, seems to have been aimed at removing
this "dual" method of computing the intestate share by stating that it is to be computed
before taxes. Here the legislature adopted that method of computation most beneficial to
the surviving spouse as did the court of appeals in Matter of Wolf, supra.
The proviso in the statute that nothing contained in it should be construed as relieving
the spouse from taxes under § 124 seems to be a codification of the holding in Matter of
Peters, supra, that, while the widow could take free of federal taxes by reason of the
marital deduction, she would still be liable for whatever state taxes were applicable under
§ 124. Here the court was determining what deductions should be made from the intestate
share as already computed. 204 Misc. at 338-39, 88 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
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of election to take more than was given by the will. Yet by reason of the
applicable estate taxes the share under the will would, in fact, be less than
the share in intestacy. The Edwards court, in the face of this argument, held
that taxes are not to be considered in relation to section eighteen and, therefore, no right of election based upon a tax theory could exist. In reaching this
conclusion the court relied in part upon Matter of Wolf 6 where the court of
appeals held that, where the testator failed to provide for apportionment, the
intestate share was to be computed before apportionment of taxes under section
124 of the Decedent Estate Law. The right of election in this case was
conceded so that the only question before the court was the amount the widow
should be allowed to take by election. No provision by will had been made
in the Wolf case. Thus the court was not called upon to measure the provisions
of a will, and compare it with the intestate share to determine whether a
right of election existed. Wolf, therefore, is not authority for the manner
in which a share under a will is to be computed for purposes of comparison
with the intestate share. The surrogate in Edwards, therefore, having no
authority directly in point, assumed that the share under the will was to be
measured in the same way as the intestate share. It is important to note that
the court of appeals in the Wolf case expressly stated that it had adopted
that method of computing the intestate share which would be the most beneficial to the widow. 7 This has been the general rule of construction of section
eighteen. 8 It seems odd, therefore, that it should be used to justify a method
of computation which is detrimental to the widow. Nevertheless, this was done
in the Edwards case. It is submitted that the result in Edwards is open to
question.
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION

Under section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and section 249-s
of the New York Tax Law, the corpus of a trust for the benefit of the surviving spouse for life, wherein the spouse has the sole and exclusive power of
appointment of the corpus, would be deducted from the value of the gross
estate before the assessment of estate taxes.9 This is the so-called marital
deduction. The trust corpus, therefore, would not bear any of the burden of
such taxes. In Edwards, however, no such power of appointment was given
the widow and thus the marital deduction was not applicable to the trust in
6.

307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224 (1954).

7. Id. at 289, 121 N.E.2d at 228.
8. See e.g., Matter of Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 472, 184 N.E. 56, 58 (1933).

9. The marital deduction was first introduced into estate taxation by the Int. Rev.
Act of 1948, c. 168, § 361, 62 Stat. 117. It was intended to equalize the tax on estates in

common law and community property states. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056, gives the
gross estate a deduction not to exceed fifty percent of the "adjusted gross estate" for the
value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse. There is no deduction, however, for interests which will terminate
on the death of the surviving spouse unless such spouse has a power of appointment
which is sufficiently broad to be a taxable power for estate tax and gift tax purposes. See
Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, cc. 16-18 (1956).
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that case and the corpus would bear a portion of the estate taxes. Had the
widow been taking by intestacy, however, the marital deduction would have
applied0 to her share in intestacy and it would not have been burdened by estate
taxes.'
Federal estate taxes are levied upon the gross estate and the marital deduction accrues to the gross estate not to the surviving spouse personally.'1
The individual states, therefore, are free to determine both the manner in
which such taxes are to be apportioned 12 and also who is to receive the benefit of
the marital deduction."3 New York, in section 124 of the Decedent Estate
Law, has provided that, except where the testator otherwise directs, the tax
shall be equitably apportioned among the persons interested in the gross tax
estate.'4 The statute also provides that, in the absence of directions to the
contrary, the benefit of any deductions created by the tax law by reason of
the relationship of any person to the deceased shall accrue to the benefit of the
person bearing such relationship.' 5 Since section 124 applies only where no
other provision has been made, 16 the testator is given the power by section 124
to declare both the manner in which the tax is to be apportioned and also the
person who is to receive the benefit of any applicable deductions which, as
pointed out, accrue to the benefit of the gross estate under federal law. Thus,
a testator may shift the entire burden of estate taxes to the widow's share
that share of deductions to which it would
under the will and may deprive
7
otherwise have been entitled.'
SECTION 124 AND ITs EFFECT UPON THE RIGHT TO ELECT
Two situations arise as a result of section 124. First, the testator may,
as was done in the Edwards case, provide that the trust to the widow is to
bear its equitable share of the estate taxes. Thus, the testator simply provides
expressly for the same manner of apportionment which section 124 would have
brought into play had the testator failed to make any provision.' 8 Second,
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(a); N.Y. Tax Law § 249-s(4). It may be
argued that all that was held in Matter of Edwards was that the testator is not obligated
to draw his will so as to give his spouse the benefit of the marital deduction. It cannot be
doubted that this is so. The testator, however, is obliged to draw his will in such a
way that he leaves his spouse the enjoyment for life of a principal equal to her intestate
share if he wishes to bar her from electing against his will. See notes 22, 24-28 infra
and accompanying text. The fact that testator has no obligation in respect to the
marital deduction should not be made the basis for relieving him of the obligation which
he does have in respect to what he must provide in his will to satisfy § 18.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 "(1942).
13. See e.g., Foerster v. Foerster, 122 N.E.2d 314 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1954).
14. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 124(1).
15. Id. § 124(3).
16. Matter of Mills, 189 Misc. 136, 141, 64 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109 (Surr. Ct. 1946), aff'd,
272 App. Div. 229, 70 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1012, 80 N.E.2d 535
(1948); Matter of Durkee, 183 Misc. 382, 47 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Surr. Ct. 1944).
17. Matter of Pepper, 307 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E.2d 807 (1954).

18. Whether a valid distinction may be drawn between a case where the testator ex-
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the testator may expressly provide for apportionment of taxes in a manner other
than the equitable apportionment method of section 124. Both situations
must be considered in relation to section eighteen.
In regard to the first situation the affirmance of the Edwards case by the
court of appeals has apparently settled the law. No right of election will be
created by the mere fact that a testator declares that a trust corpus for the
benefit of his spouse shall bear its equitable portion of the estate taxes even
though he thereby reduces the corpus below the share which such spouse
would have taken in intestacy. It follows a fortiori that if an express declaration by the testator that taxes are to be apportioned equitably is not sufficient
to create a right of election, mere silence, which permits section 124 to operate
to the same effect, will not create such a right. 19 It may be urged in support
of the Edwards rule that the legislature, in enacting section eighteen, intended
only to protect the spouse from being deprived of that share in the estate which
section eighty-three would give her if decedent died intestate, and not to
protect her from the operation of tax laws not then in existence. Thus, if a
later tax law should give the spouse a "windfall" by freeing her share in
intestacy from estate taxes, it was not the intention of the legislature in
section eighteen to protect her from being deprived of this "windfall" by a
will.2 0 The fatal defect of this position is that the legislature at the time it
passed section eighteen made its intention quite clear: equality of amount

actually received whether in trust by the will or outright in intestacy.21 It is
far more probable that the legislature assumed that both the share in the will
and the share in intestacy would be equally burdened by estate taxes and,
therefore, the desired equality of amount would be maintained automatically
without the need to consider taxes when applying section eighteen. As the
Edwards case demonstrates, equality of taxation is not always the situation.
pressly declares that taxes be equitably apportioned and one in which an equitable apportionment is brought about by the operation of § 124 where the testator has made
no provision is considered in note 19 infra.
19. In Matter of Noble, 2 A.D.2d 897, 157 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't), modifying, 3
Misc. 2d 565, 155 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Surr. Ct. 1956), the appellate division, second department, granted the widow a limited right of election to take the estate taxes. In that
case, as in the Edwards case, the testator had expressly stated that taxes were to be
equitably apportioned. The basis of this decision was that the taxes were apportioned
by act of the testator not by mere operation of law under § 124. This does not appear
to be a sound distinction. Section 124 applies in the absence of express provisions to the
contrary. A direction for a method of apportionment which is the same as the statutory
method is, therefore, mere surplusage and should not be determinative of the widow's right
to elect. It is submitted that it would have been sounder for the court to have held
that, since the testator may control the tax burden, he has made a choice even where he
does no more than permit the provisions of § 124 to take effect as a result of his silence.
In view of the conflict between Matter of Edwards and Matter of Noble, supra, it is
indeed unfortunate that the court of appeals did not write an opinion when affirming
Matter of Edwards.
20. The marital deduction was not made a part of estate tax law until 1948 almost
twenty years after the passage of §§ 18 and 124. See note 9 supra.
21. See notes 25-29 infra.
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A more compelling argument in support of Edwards is that to permit the
widow to elect in such a case would be to require testators to anticipate the
effect of present and future tax laws at the risk of creating a right of election
where the intention was to bar such a right. This argument clearly demonstrates the need for a legislative clarification of sections 18 and 124 particularly
with respect to the manner in which the share under the will is to be
evaluated. Section eighteen states that the intestate share against which
the bequest in the will is to be measured is to be computed before taxes. At
the same time it requires that a testator who wishes to bar any right of
election must provide his, spouse with an absolute legacy or devise of at least
$2,500 and a "trust for ...

her benefit for life of a principal equal to or more

22
than the excess between said legacy or devise and . . . her intestate share.1
If the net estate before taxes is $90,000 and section eighty-three gives the
widow a one third share, then her intestate share is $30,000. If the will provides a legacy of $2,500 and a trust principal of $27,500 but, in fact, that
principal is reduced by estate taxes to, for example, $26,500, does the will
provide the widow with a trust for her benefit for life of a principal equal to
the difference between her legacy and her intestate share? Clearly it does
not.23 Even if it be argued that she may not have actually received $30,000
in intestacy it would not seem that the will in such a case satisfies section
eighteen. Certainly it does not satisfy section eighteen where a greater amount
could be taken outright in intestacy than the will provides in trust. Equality
of amount actually received either in trust or outright was clearly the legislative
intent behind section eighteen.2 4 To support this interpretation one need
only look to the history of the statute. Section eighteen was intended to insure
the surviving spouse of at least a certain minimum participation in the decedent's estate. 25 It is the well established rule that the statute is to be liberally
construed in favor of that interpretation which is most beneficial to the surviving

22. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 18(1) (d).
23. See Matter of Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 470, 184 N.E. 56, 57 (1933) where the
court of appeals said, "In making these provisions [§ 18] it was the evident purpose
of the Legislature that a surviving spouse should retain the right to claim his or her
full intestate share, in spite of any will, unless the instrument should provide substantiil
equivalents."
24. See e.g., Matter of Ittelson, 197 Misc. 786, 94 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Matter
of Goldsmith, 177 Misc. 298, 30 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Matter of Clark, 169 Misc.
202, 7 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1938). In Matter of Itteison, supra at 787, 94 N.Y.S.2d at
789, the court said: "Section 18 . . . grants to a surviving spouse . . . a personal right to

elect to take his or her share of the estate . . . 'as in intestacy'. The primary measure
. ..

is the share in intestacy provided in section 83 .

. .

. It is against this measure that,

in the first instance, the adequacy of any testamentary provision must be considered and
the extent of any elective share must be determined."
25. Matter of Byrnes, 141 Misc. 346, 347, 252 N.Y. Supp. 587, 588 (Surr. Ct. 1931),
aff'd, 253 App. Div. 782, 257 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N.Y. 465, 184

N.E. 56 (1933); Matter of Jackson, 176 Misc. 1020, 29 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Surr. Ct. 1941);
Matter of Clark, 169 Misc. 202, 7 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1938); N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1929)
No. 62, pp. 20-21.
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The section was intended to safeguard the widow from having her
spouse.
share "whittled down by the ingenuity of the draftsman of a will." 27 To effectuate this purpose the legislature attempted "to assure a surviving spouse
of the beneficial enjoyment of that portion of the estate of a decedent which
he or she would have received in intestacy. ' 28 On the other hand, if a different
standard is to be employed in measuring the share under the will than is
employed to measure the intestate share, how may this intended equality
of amount be maintained? It would seem that a more practical approach to
section eighteen is required. The comparison between intestate share and
share under the will should be made upon the basis of net amounts which
would actually be received free and clear. This would require amendment of
section eighteen and would undoubtedly create problems for the draftsmen of
wills but it certainly would be more consistent with the legislative intent than
is the Edwards rule or the present application of section 124. Is it not ingenuity to allow section 124 to "whittle down" the spouse's share in the will
of that portion of the
so that she does not receive the beneficial enjoyment
29
estate which she would have received in intestacy?
In regard to the second situation under section 124, where the testator
expressly provides for an apportionment of taxes other than by the equitable
apportionment method of section 124, the law is still unsettled as to the question of a right of election. In Matter of Pepper"° the testator shifted the
burden of estate taxes from the shares of his sisters to that of his widow. The
result, however, was that the widow still actually received in trust an amount
at least equal to the share she would actually have received in intestacy. The
court said:
[A]s long as he [the testator] makes such provision for his spouse as the law requires
. . . the testator is privileged to cause a shift of the tax burden of his estate from
26. See note 8 supra.
27. Matter of Byrnes, 141 Misc. 346, 350, 252 N.Y. Supp. 587, 591 (Surr. Ct. 1931),
aff'd mem., 235 App. Div. 782, 257 N.Y. Supp. 884 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 260 N.Y. 465, 184
N.E. 56 (1933). That a similar motive was behind the enactment of § 124 can be
seen by the remarks of the Decedent Estate Commission which drafted the statute:
"The principal objection to an estate tax has been that where the decedent dies having a will,
and makes no provision therein to the contrary, the entire burden of the tax must be
borne by the residuary legatee or legatees. Experience has demonstrated that in most
estates the residuary legatees are the widow, children, or nearer and more dependent
relatives." Combined Reports of the Decedent Estate Commission 138 (1930).
28. N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1929) No. 62, pp. 20-21. (Emphasis added.)
29. See note 19 supra. From a practical point of view it may be assumed that the
draftsmen of wills would consider it "ingenious" to allow § 124 to reduce the spouse's
share below the intestate share. There is some indication that the testator in Matter of
Edwards may have intentionally drawn his will in such a way as to achieve the result
which occurred. There had been litigation involving some bitterness between testator
and the widow. See Brief for Respondent Columbia University, p. 4, Matter of Edwards,
3 N.Y.2d 739, 143 N.E.2d 520 (1957).
30.

307 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E.2d 807 (1954).
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the sisters to the widow, thus imposing a burden upon the widow which the law

would not have imposed ....

31

The problem which will eventually arise lies in the extension of cases such
as the Pepper case to extreme situations.3 2 Where a testator so shifts the tax
burden as to reduce drastically the trust corpus below the intestate share the
question of a right of election will become of paramount importance. In such
a case it seems unlikely that the courts will refuse any right of election. The
problem will be how to justify granting such a right and to what extent should
it be granted. Section eighteen makes it clear that the legislature did not
intend that the right of election should depend upon judicial discretion and
questions of degree. The section was obviously intended to specify the situations in which the right of election would exist and to exclude all other situations. Certainly it would seem that the courts would not apply the Edwards
rule to such a case. Yet, purely from a logical point of view, there is no reason
why they should not.33 The basic difference between the Edwards case and
the hypothetical situation now being discussed is, in the final analysis, merely
one of degree. 3 4 If it may be assumed, however, that the Edwards rule will
not be applied and a right of election will be granted, upon what grounds may
the giving of such a right be justified? Certainly no resort could be had to the
legislative intent of equality of amount in section eighteen without thereby
detracting from the validity of the Edwards holding. It is probable that the
courts in such cases will fall back upon the Pepper case and the limitation
implied therein that the testator must make such provisions for his spouse as
the "law requires." On this reasoning the courts could grant a limited right to
elect to take that amount of the taxes up to the amount which the share
would have to bear under an equitable apportionment. Edwards is the law
31. Id. at 249, 120 N.E.2d at 810.
32. It is interesting to note in this connection that the surrogate in Matter of
Edwards, citing Matter of Pepper, indicated that it would permit such extensions. Matter
of Edwards, 2 Misc. 2d at 569, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
33. It may be argued that there is a vast distinction between a case where the apportionment of taxes is by operation of law and one in which the testator himself expressly provides for an apportionment by other than the statutory method. Thus, it
may be urged, the rule of Matter of Edwards could be limited to the former situation
without logically conflicting with a possible right of election in the latter situation. As a
practical matter it would seem to be just as much an exercise of power by the testator to
permit a statute to operate as it would be to prevent it from operating. This appears,
therefore, to be a distinction without meaning. See also note 19 supra.
34. The court in Matter of Clark, 169 Misc. 202, 206-207, 7 N.Y.S.2d 176, 180 (Surr.
Ct. 1938), made the same point when it said: "It is obviously immaterial in evaluating
the authority of a testator in this regard [apportionment of taxes] as to whether the
invasion of the devolutionary rights of the surviving spouse is great or small. Any invasion,
if it be such, is not permissible. If, however, any invasion, no matter how small, may
pass unchallenged, the entire beneficent purpose of the enactment [§ 18] is undermined
since if the principle be once established, its application would be possible of extension
to a point which would destroy the utility of the statute as a safeguard against disinheritance of a surviving spouse."

